The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran now carries existential implications for both nations and has the potential to significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of the broader Middle East. This situation also presents critical challenges for Turkey, another key regional player.
From the beginning, President Erdoğan has taken an anti-Israel stance while endorsing Iran’s right to defend itself, as the rivalry with Israel has evolved into a strategic competition that extends beyond Gaza.
In his public declarations and conversations with foreign leaders—including Donald Trump—Erdoğan has positioned Israel as the primary threat to both regional and global stability.
For Turkey, the escalating tensions involving the U.S.—including airstrikes on Iran’s facilities, the possibility of regime change in Iran, and ongoing missile exchanges between Tehran and Tel Aviv—pose a series of significant challenges and dilemmas for Turkish leadership.
An indication of Turkey’s challenging position is reflected in a recent Foreign Ministry statement, which, while not condemning the American airstrikes, expressed concern that they could exacerbate tensions. The ministry called for both parties to avoid actions that threaten lives and advocated for negotiations.
Shortly thereafter, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency issued a more pointed warning to the U.S., stating that aligning with Israel’s aggressive actions would lead to “chaos and confusion, not peace and stability in the Middle East.”
Framing Turkey’s stance within an ideological context, Erdoğan remarked that “the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in increased radicalization and terrorism globally, and similarly, a U.S. attack on Iran is likely to create comparable ramifications, linking America’s military actions to shifts in Europe’s political dynamics, fostering xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, and intensifying hostility towards the West and anti-American sentiments in the East.”
Since the Gaza conflict, Turkey has shaped its foreign policy around countering Israel as a rival regional power, believing that the region cannot support two dominant powers. Turkey aspires to enhance its hegemonic status among Muslim populations, investing in this strategy since the onset of the Gaza war and now attempting to recalibrate it in light of new developments.
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Ankara views a protracted conflict between Iran and Israel as the most favorable outcome, believing that mutual attrition will weaken both regional powers.
Despite this, Erdoğan seems intent on seizing the opportunity to present Turkey as a “mediator” in conflict resolution, similar to its role in the Ukraine crisis. However, this initiative (reported by Axios) did not progress, as Trump ignored Erdoğan’s offer following their phone call and instead authorized the bombing of Iran.
Turkey is concerned that Washington, which had shown indications of distancing from Israel, is reverting to its long-standing policy of strongly supporting Israel’s security.
Following a Cabinet meeting, Erdoğan’s remarks that Israel’s actions “threaten its existence and future with every act of brutality, bloodshed, and crime against humanity” echoed Iran’s rhetoric calling for Israel’s destruction.
The U.S.’s involvement represents a negative turn for Turkey, as it solidifies the U.S.-Israel alliance, which could categorize every enemy of Israel as an adversary of the U.S.
Thus far, Turkey has focused its criticism on Netanyahu to justify its anti-Israel campaign. However, concerning Iran, the context has shifted, as even Israeli opposition parties back governmental decisions, and Western leaders, including German Chancellor V. Merz, acknowledge that “Israel is performing the dirty work on behalf of everyone.”
There is a looming risk that Israel could emerge from this conflict yet stronger, and if it realizes its objectives with U.S. backing, it will retain its position as an unassailable regional power, compelling Turkey to acquiesce.
This would naturally undermine Ankara’s ambitions regarding Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, limiting its broader regional aspirations in the Middle East.
Erdoğan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli of the nationalist far-right party, did not conceal his viewpoint: “The operation against Iran also serves as a veiled warning to Turkey. It’s an indirect response to the vision of a ‘Turkish Century,’ which seeks a future free from terrorism and harnessing the revitalized spirit emerging within our homeland… Curbing Israel is not only a matter of national security but a historical obligation for regional peace and stability.”
Erdoğan’s relationship with Tehran has had multiple layers; he was previously involved in a significant Iranian operation to launder billions of dollars through Halkbank while circumventing the oil export embargo.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s connection with Iran is marked by mutual suspicion. Iran’s Shiite leadership harbors chronic distrust towards Erdoğan, who is pursuing a leadership role in the Sunni world while attempting to balance relations with both sides. They remain skeptical of Erdoğan’s intentions, despite his indirect support against Israel, particularly since his efforts to oust Assad jeopardized Iran’s plans for influence in Syria, which include strategic access to the Mediterranean and Israel’s northern borders.
Tehran suspects that Erdoğan’s engagement with them is aimed at solidifying his regional standing and re-establishing ties with the U.S.
The prospect of regime change in Tehran poses further complications for Ankara. A return to democracy in Iran could realign the geopolitical borders of the West eastward. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey was envisioned as the West’s bulwark against Iranian threats and Russian influence—a role that is now under scrutiny due to its ties with Putin. Such a transformation in Iran would undermine Turkey’s historical position.
Additionally, Ankara cannot ignore Greece’s careful and balanced approach, which has enabled it to sustain high-level relations with Israel during both the Gaza War and the Israel-Iran conflict—a relationship that Turkey perceives as a threat, especially when synergizing regional cooperatives with nations like Cyprus and Egypt.
Interestingly, Turkey may find itself at a greater advantage than Iran if projects such as the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Corridor), which exclude Turkey and highlight Gulf Arab nations alongside Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, are delayed or abandoned.
While the potential creation of a new geopolitical map—including Iran’s capitulation, the conclusion of the Gaza conflict, and the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel—seems distant, it is central to Donald Trump’s strategic vision. This emerging “big picture,” which could realign power dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, offers little room for a hegemonic Turkey.
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