Athens’ strategic initiatives and concealed threats to deter Turkey’s accession into European defense markets

The safeguards established through the SAFE mechanism for distributing €150 billion in European loans will face real-world testing. The primary goal is to prevent this mechanism from being misused for unregulated support of Turkey’s defense sector or to cultivate a special relationship between Ankara and the EU focused on European Defense.

The protections outlined in the SAFE Regulation and approved by COREPER and the General Affairs Council are open to various interpretations and can be influenced by political dynamics and diplomatic balances.

Diplomatic sources in Athens addressed recent criticisms from opposition parties, underscoring that consensus and national security interests are being prioritized.

Specifically, these sources conveyed:

• The Regulation is a targeted financial initiative with a specified four-year timeframe. It was adopted by a qualified majority, with 26 states, including Greece and Cyprus, voting in favor, hence no veto is possible.
• Throughout negotiations, Greece secured significant legal guarantees concerning the terms for candidate countries’ participation.
• The Regulation establishes a broad framework, with subsequent bilateral agreements between the EU and third countries to follow, contingent on fulfilling the necessary conditions. After Greek intervention, these agreements will require unanimity, as outlined in Article 212 of the TFEU.

Diplomatic sources sought to alleviate concerns that Greece’s safeguards might be overlooked, clarifying that at the outset, the plan did not allow for blockage—neither by Greece nor by Cyprus.

Within the EU, a positive atmosphere has emerged for collaboration with Turkey in defense, with the prevailing sentiment that such cooperation could draw Ankara closer to Europe, even as Turkey pursues an independent foreign policy that often diverges from EU principles and goals.

Turkey’s collaboration with Italian and Spanish defense firms, alongside NATO’s push for enhanced cooperation with non-EU member states, provides considerable diplomatic leverage for Ankara.

The enforcement of the safeguards obtained by Greece will be continually scrutinized, as they are subject to multiple interpretations that may be swayed by partner pressures to ease military collaboration with Turkey.

The legal basis under Article 212 of the TFEU for agreements with third countries specifies participation in 65% of the project or procurement value. However, this is not clearly stated in the Regulation but appears in a European Commission statement attached to COREPER and General Affairs Council minutes. This diminishes its binding nature since, in cases of impasse or lack of unanimity, the Commission is not institutionally bound to adhere to a different legal basis that permits third-country participation via majority voting.

Furthermore, Article 16 of the Regulation states:

“Guarantees provide assurances that the participation of the contractor or subcontractor in joint procurement does not conflict with the security and defense interests of the Union and Member States, as defined within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”

This applies to firms competing for projects worth 35%, with no formal obligation beyond this reference.

For third-country companies wishing to engage in joint ventures with European firms or through entities acquired by European companies, it will be challenging to convincingly argue that such involvement jeopardizes EU and member states’ security and defense interests. Decisions will be made by qualified majority.

In this context, Greece, through the approval of the SAFE mechanism Regulation, possesses tools to advocate for specific parameters and conditions regarding Turkey’s role in European arms exports. However, this will necessitate ongoing vigilance and significant diplomatic resources.

This endeavor will undoubtedly influence Greece’s relations with Ankara, as Turkey interprets any Greek attempt to strengthen ties with the EU—particularly when Greece underscores Turkey’s ongoing threats against a member state and its occupation of another’s territory—as hostile and detrimental to Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

In this ongoing struggle, Greece also faces challenges from some allies who persist in shortsighted approaches toward Turkey, often ignoring that potential short-term advantages of Turkey’s unregulated entry into European Defense ultimately undermine the foundational principles of the EU’s Common Defense and Strategic Autonomy in an increasingly unstable global environment.