For the past quarter-century, June 8 has been a day of sorrow for the Saunders family.
This is particularly true for the family of the British military attaché in Athens, who was brutally murdered on June 8, 2000, by the terrorist group November 17 (17N). The heinous act occurred on the southbound side of Kifisias Avenue at the Filothei traffic light during the morning commute, witnessed by countless drivers and passengers.
At 7:40 a.m., 53-year-old Stephen Saunders arrived at the scene after setting off from Kifisia 40 minutes earlier. He was driving alone in his white Rover, with no security detail.
As the traffic light turned red, his vehicle came to a halt—a signal that unfortunately marked the end of his life. In just seconds, a motorcycle with two riders pulled up beside his car. The passenger opened fire with a G-3 rifle, which malfunctioned.
Quickly, the motorcycle’s driver produced a revolver—later identified as a .45 caliber—and shot the British officer in cold blood.
Panic erupted. Saunders’s white car was drenched in his blood. Before the light had even changed, both assailants had vanished. Severely injured with four bullet wounds in his abdomen and arms, Saunders was rushed to “Red Cross” Hospital, where he underwent surgery but sadly did not survive. Later, “November 17” claimed responsibility for the murder, marking it as the conclusion of their “red” cycle.
Turning Point
However, June 8, 2000, became a crucial moment for authorities aiming to dismantle “November 17.” The choice of Saunders as a target had severe repercussions for the group, significantly shifting investigative efforts. British Prime Minister Tony Blair urged Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis to involve British intelligence in the 17N investigation.
Agents from Scotland Yard and MI6 swiftly arrived in Athens, transforming the strategies employed by the Greek Anti-Terrorism Unit. All operations conducted by 17N—assassinations, robbery attempts, bombings, manifestos, and various clues from earlier attacks—were re-evaluated with a newfound focus. The British approach, honed from decades of counter-terrorism work against the IRA, brought sharper insights.
Diligently re-examining every detail, even those initially dismissed as insignificant, allowed for the development of new profiles of potential suspects and a broader interpretation of witness statements. Past incidents thought to have been misses by the authorities were also revisited, including the Louizis Riankour case and a shootout in Sepolia.
Per a request from British officials, there was a concerted initiative to challenge the “pro-people” image of terrorist factions. Initially, 17N’s identity was supported by targeting former junta-era police torturers to claim moral authority for their actions.
This created a form of societal complicity, where some individuals aware of the group’s activities hesitated to speak up. To counter this, the British and Greek authorities collaborated on a public relations campaign to showcase the suffering of 17N’s victims and their families.
Witness “X”
The shift in public perception was bolstered by the assertive actions of then Public Order Minister Michalis Chrysochoidis. In his book “On the Same Road,” he recounts how this stance prompted earlier supporters of the terrorists to reevaluate their beliefs, realizing the futility of an endeavor rooted in violence. He also mentioned a critical informant, referred to as “X,” who played a pivotal role in the downfall of 17N.
This witness shared important information about specific 17N members, including Pavlos Serifis, who participated in Saunders’s murder. More crucially, he offered insights into the group’s motivations and psychological profiles, indicating that many were already under police scrutiny.
This led to the identification of Vassilis Tzortzatos, initially detained in 1992 while surveilling U.S. military attaché McIntyre, and later released due to insufficient evidence. The informant further confirmed that Alexandros Giotopoulos was indeed “The Tall One,” believed to be 17N’s leader.
Some insiders speculate that even if Savvas Xiros hadn’t been injured in a bombing incident on June 29, 2002, the disbanding of 17N was already underway. The explosion merely hastened an inevitable collapse. By early 2002, rumors were rife regarding imminent arrests of terrorists.
A Chain of Fatal Mistakes
Targeting Saunders was not 17N’s first blunder, but it was a decisive one. Although meticulously planned and executed, it later surfaced that the terrorists were unaware of their victim’s identity. Doubts arose over whether they had even intended to kill Saunders.
In court, Savvas Xiros recounted the chilling details of the murder, stating, “The organization issued a proclamation for this action written in advance by ‘Lambros’ (Giotopoulos) and typed by ‘Loukas’ (Koufontinas). We didn’t know the victim’s name at the time; we learned it from the news and ‘Loukas’ added it to the text.”
In their claim of responsibility, 17N erroneously asserted that Saunders held a key role in NATO’s bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, alleging that he had been stationed in Greece with specific responsibilities. In reality, Saunders had no such involvement.
Days after many 17N members were arrested on July 24, 2002, The Times of London reported, citing Greek police sources, that one detainee had confessed that the intended target of the June 8, 2000 attack was someone else entirely.
That individual was an American officer with the same surname who had indeed participated in NATO’s bombing strategies during the Kosovo conflict while based in Aviano, Italy. He had visited Greece as part of a NATO planning delegation. Indicative of the terrorists’ error was their mislabeling of Brigadier Stephen Saunders as an “Air Force marshal,” when he was in fact an Army officer.
“We’ve Got November 17”
The final and most critical blunder of 17N occurred late on the night of Saturday, June 29, 2002. At 10:25 p.m., outside the Hellas Flying Dolphins ticket office in Piraeus, a 40-year-old man sustained severe injuries when a bomb he was carrying detonated. That man was Savvas Xiros.
Rushed to Evangelismos Hospital, Xiros was critically injured, but doctors managed to save him, marking the beginning of the end for 17N.
Nearby, police discovered a backpack belonging to Xiros, which contained a .38 revolver. Forensic analysis linked this weapon to the service revolver of police officer Christos Matis, murdered in 1984 during a robbery. 17N had never claimed responsibility for that particular murder, but ballistics revealed the revolver had been used in several of their attacks. “We’ve got November 17,” remarked Police Chief Fotis Nasiakos to Minister Michalis Chrysochoidis shortly after the discovery.
Lingering Mysteries
Xiros’s arrest, however, raised numerous questions that remain unanswered. While the bomb explosion was a significant error, the possession of an iconic murder weapon raised eyebrows. Also discovered was a keyring with numerous keys, including those to safehouses located on Patmou Street in Patissia and Damareos Street in Pangrati. Why was Xiros carrying such incriminating evidence?
Another mystery involves the whereabouts of significant items from 17N’s history. When anti-terrorism officers raided their hideouts, they seized various weapons, including the G-3 rifle used in Saunders’s killing, explosives, documents, proclamations, and even the 17N flag.
However, they did not find:
- The historic .45-caliber pistol used in the assassination of Richard Welch,
- The organization’s seal, or
- The first typewriter used by them, known for not printing the full letter “P.”
These items remain missing, as do many of the group’s funds, the location of which is still uncertain.
Are Members Still at Large?
Another unresolved issue is whether any 17N members are still at large. Several fingerprints collected from hideouts have never been matched to known suspects, including a print found at the Damareos safehouse, which matched one from Alexandros Giotopoulos’s home on Leipsoi.
Additionally, DNA samples from the hideouts—one male and one female—remain unidentified. The identity of the woman involved in 17N’s initial attack, the 1975 assassination of CIA Station Chief Richard Welch, also remains unknown. In a recent interview with Proto Thema, former CIA officer John Kiriakou expressed his belief that “four or five members of 17N are still at large—almost all men, and at least one woman, linked to the Welch assassination. If she’s alive, she’d be around 75 years old today.”
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